Probe inputs and transports
Since 1.8.0, Cert-X-Gen gives probes additional inputs and transport operations. None of these inputs establishes a finding on its own. The engine proof contract still applies.
More than two named identities
Section titled “More than two named identities”Templates can declare @requires_identities as a role-to-profile mapping.
Authenticated roles name distinct captured profiles. The reserved anonymous
binding instead creates a clean guest with no inherited credentials or tier.
Only non-anonymous bindings count toward @requires_auth_count. A saved profile
passed as --auth anonymous is still a normal profile lookup; it is not this
reserved role binding. A role name does not prove privilege
or tenant membership; the captured facts and requests establish that. Missing
named profiles become an auth_skipped entry even if enough other profiles exist
to satisfy the numeric identity count.
cxg.pageAs(idx) drives another loaded identity’s DOM in its own browser context.
HTTP transports retain identity routing through the existing As APIs. Engine
proof requires the identities to have participated in the dispatch, not only to
have been declared.
Mail, TOTP and operator answers
Section titled “Mail, TOTP and operator answers”| Primitive | Input | Missing input |
|---|---|---|
cxg.mail.latest |
matching IMAP messages from an operator-configured source | explicit error or scheduling skip |
cxg.totp |
private per-identity seed slots | explicit error or scheduling skip |
cxg.ask |
operator answer through a bounded file exchange | wait, timeout or cancellation, never an invented answer |
--auth-inputs supplies operator-owned mail and question configuration.
Templates declare the mail, totp and ask capabilities. TOTP seeds stay out
of the page. cxg pentest capabilities reports these protocol capabilities;
it does not claim the required accounts or inputs exist.
Scripted transports
Section titled “Scripted transports”- WebSocket exchanges support subprotocols, ordered send/expect operations and
binary frames.
cxg.attacker.wsoriginates from the foreign attacker origin for cross-site WebSocket hijacking probes. cxg.socket.exchangesupports ordered send, delimiter-read and timed-read operations on a single raw connection. The raw-socket opt-in and scope gates still apply.--insecure-tls,--proxy,--client-certand--client-keyconfigure web transport. An unusable dead-target navigation is refused.
A transport exchange is evidence of traffic, not proof of the class. The engine still needs the class-specific observation and controls.
Save HTTP reproductions deliberately
Section titled “Save HTTP reproductions deliberately”--capture-http opts web JavaScript probes into redacted per-template
traffic.har and repro.curl artifacts. Confirmed findings carry an endpoint-selected
HAR slice and curl reproductions under evidence._cxg_http.
Credentials are redacted. Replace credentials before replaying a reproduction, and read each request: the curl file replays individual requests, not a complete multi-request proof. This option is not implicit in a Bravos run.
The installed release’s auth-input, oracle, WebSocket, OAST-listener and HTTP-capture checks were exercised locally. These are controlled checks, not a claim that a mail provider or your target was tested. For flag syntax, use the generated pentest reference.
Paths keep the scope’s prefix
Section titled “Paths keep the scope’s prefix”A relative path in cxg.fetch or cxg.url resolves under the path of
--scope. This probe asked for /api/profile both ways:
const r = await cxg.fetch('/api/profile');// evidence: {url: cxg.url('/api/profile'), status: r.status}Replayed on 1.9.2 with --scope http://127.0.0.1:8934/dashboard, the audit log
recorded the request at http://127.0.0.1:8934/dashboard/api/profile, and
cxg.url returned the same URL. 1.9.0
and 1.9.1 sent the same probe to http://127.0.0.1:8934/api/profile, with no
prefix, as did 1.9.0. Write paths relative to the scope, not to the host.
The engine’s excluded-records oracle is the exception: its three requests
resolve at the origin. On the same 1.9.2 build, under
--scope http://127.0.0.1:8933/dashboard, they went to /api/requests/export,
/api/requests and /api/orders. See
A filtered list needs a record comparison.
Identity traffic and the session check go to the --scope target too. A
profile imported for http://127.0.0.1:8939, where nothing listens, ran
against --scope http://127.0.0.1:8934/dashboard as a ready profile; 1.9.1
sent its liveness check to :8939 and skipped it as unavailable. A profile
keeps its own saved origin only when it was imported with --service.
Scope is checked before redirect hops
Section titled “Scope is checked before redirect hops”Since 1.8.0 the engine checks each HTTP redirect destination and the effective method before dispatching the next request, including identity and health traffic. Explicit primitive methods obey the same scope checks. An off-scope redirect or disallowed method is a refusal, not a target denial or proof that a control held. Malformed HTTP primitive arguments are reported as execution/input errors; they do not become clean refutations. Native browser networking APIs that bypass engine scope and auditing are rejected by the validator.
Captured authentication state files are written with private permissions (0600 where supported); newly created auth directories use 0700. Existing directory permissions remain the operator’s responsibility, and CI can refuse a world-accessible auth directory. The complete audit measures engine setup and identity traffic as well as probe traffic. Budget use is not total networking.

