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All versions since 1.5.0

1.5.0

Added

  • cxg pentest run can be limited to a list of routes. --only-routes <FILE> (and the repeatable --only-route <ENTRY>) tests only the hypotheses whose route or enclosing function is in the list; every other hypothesis is excluded before ranking and the --max-templates budget, and reported with its reason in the run output and a new route_allowlist block in report.json. Entries are METHOD /path (ANY/* for any method; path templates and concrete paths match each other; a trailing * is a prefix), /path, file::Function, or file:Function — one per line, or JSON, including a code graph’s codegraph_routes / codegraph_attack_surface answer passed through unchanged, so a caller can hand cxg the routes a change reached without reformatting them. Path matching reuses the code graph’s template-aware matcher. An empty list means “nothing in scope” and exits 0 without contacting the target, distinct from omitting the flag (a full run); an unreadable file, or a use with --template-dir or --template-lang py, refuses the run with exit 4. This is the cxg half of testing only a pull request’s delta in CI.

  • cxg pentest run reads a code graph when one is available. If codegraph-mcp or bravos graph is installed and a graph has been built for the codebase (bravos graph build <codebase>), cxg uses its route table as the preferred route source for --discover-routes. That covers gorilla/mux, net/http, httprouter, OpenAPI-table and Django routes the regex cannot see: on gophish discovery goes from 0 routes to 48, and on VAmPI from 0 to 14. The graph’s reachable-sink ranking (data layer, exec, outbound network, …) also becomes a ranking dimension for which hypotheses get the --max-templates budget. When the graph reports insufficient call resolution, it is not used for ranking and the run output says so. Without graph tooling, or with --no-code-graph, a run is unchanged. report.json gains a code_graph block, and each discovered hypothesis records which source its route came from.

  • Route-declaring @flows reach route discovery, and the run reports flows it cannot use. A flow whose mechanism is a route (via GET./orders/<id>) now adds that route to the --discover-routes surface when no scanned route already serves it, matching parameters across router spellings (<id>, :id, {id}). The run prints a [1h] @flows: line counting flow edges, chainable flows and route-declaring flows, and names by file and line every flow that cannot chain and every @flows line it could not read.

  • cxg pentest run tests each declared trust boundary. A guardlink SARIF that carries its model graph (sarif_profile_version 1, guardlink’s export since it added declared context) lists every @boundary with its claim key, both sides and the flows that cross it. For each boundary whose outside side guardlink can infer (one side is not a declared asset), cxg builds one auth_api hypothesis per route on the inside: a route @flows crossing inward, or a code graph route handled where an inward crossing is declared. The probe calls the route with no credential and then as the lowest-privilege identity, told the boundary’s own words, the code graph’s measured access level for the route (public, authenticated, elevated or unknown) and the data classes the inside asset handles. These hypotheses rank below every declared threat and never displace or merge with one; a boundary is a claim to test, never evidence that a route is safe. A boundary between two declared assets has no known direction and yields none. report.json gains declared_boundaries (one record per boundary, with what was built or why nothing was), and a finding from such a probe carries boundary_claim_key.

Changed

  • cxg pentest run reads guardlink’s declared context instead of re-deriving it. With a SARIF that carries it, a hypothesis’s @flows chain comes from the result’s codeFlows, its @boundary/@assumes/@handles/@transfers intent notes from its relatedLocations (same @verb: description text), and its function name from logicalLocations, rather than from source comments within 30 lines of the annotation. A hypothesis no longer picks up flows and notes declared on a neighbouring handler or asset, and does pick up notes on its own asset declared in another file. @comment and @validates, which guardlink does not export, are still read from source. An older SARIF is read exactly as before. The run prints a [1h] line saying which path it took.

  • Routes come from the code graph before the source is scraped. A guardlink hypothesis with no route takes the code graph’s route for its own handler when a graph is loaded, and the decorator scrape near the annotation no longer runs when a graph is loaded or when guardlink marked the result’s route ambiguous. Without either, the scrape remains the last resort.

  • cxg pentest run tolerates a richer guardlink SARIF. guardlink/parse-error results are skipped like guardlink/dangling-ref instead of becoming a hypothesis read as mitigated. A guardlink/boundary-claim result is read as a trust boundary to verify, never as an exposure, and the run prints a [1h] line counting them. A hypothesis whose result carries a guardlink claim key is named by it, so its id is stable when guardlink reorders results; without one the positional id is unchanged in the first run and scoped by run (gl-r1-0-…) in later runs.

  • --only-routes accepts every graph answer verbatim. Multi-method routes (GET,POST /<int:id>/update) and anonymous handler ids (file.rb::<module>/<anon:get#0>) used to refuse the whole file; they now parse, and a multi-method route matches each of its methods.

  • A vulnerability class guessed from a URL’s shape no longer earns ranking weight. With a goal, a discovered route whose class was inferred from its path alone ranks below every annotated threat and every hypothesis with code graph reach, takes no class-match bonus, and does not double its reach for the sink class its guessed class would land in.

  • cxg pentest reads @flows to the verb’s definition. The reader now accepts exactly the forms guardlink’s grammar accepts and refuses the rest, so an annotation means the same thing to both tools. Newly read: a flow with no via (recorded as not chainable, with the reason, instead of dropped), a dotted or repository-qualified target (#billing.charge), bare and dotted endpoints such as guardlink’s own example api.auth -> db.users via TLS 1.3, quoted endpoints, multi-word mechanisms, multi-hop chains (A -> B -> C, one flow per hop), and a -- "..." continuation line extending a flow’s description. A route mechanism keeps its method and full path: via GET./orders/<id> is GET /orders/<id> where cxg used to keep the channel GET.. No longer read, because guardlink rejects them: an unspaced arrow (#a->#b), a hyphen or leading digit in a bare endpoint (user-agent, 3rdparty), and a flow whose description is followed by more text. A mechanism followed by a trailing comment now carries it, as guardlink records it (redis # noqa), so the artifact name a chain is keyed on can change for such a line.

Fixed

  • An unmodelled guardlink SARIF rule is no longer read as a mitigated exposure. A guardlink/* result whose rule cxg does not model — a guardlink/agent-reach target from the pentest profile, or a rule a newer guardlink adds — used to fall through to a “be conservative, assume mitigated” branch and become a hypothesis asserted safe: a probe slot spent on a non-finding and a clean bill cxg never earned. On guardlink’s own support-desk pentest export that was 14 fabricated mitigated hypotheses beside the one real exposure. Such a result is now skipped and counted, and cxg pentest run prints what it declined to read (skipped N result(s) … none assumed mitigated). guardlink/mitigated-exposure is handled explicitly as a covered exposure that names its covering @mitigates/@accepts control from the result’s suppressions, instead of reaching the mitigated flag by accident. Results from non-guardlink tools, and guardlink’s hyphen-prefixed extended schema, are unchanged.

  • Go templates that import third-party packages now compile. cxg built a Go template with go build <file> and never resolved its imports, so a template importing anything outside the standard library failed with “no required module provides package …” — cxg scan --templates grpc-reflection-abuse among them — unless the operator first wrote a go.mod and ran go get by hand. A template that imports a non-stdlib package and is not inside a Go module is now built in a private module at ~/.cert-x-gen/cache/go-modules/<stem>-<sha256>/ (honouring CERT_X_GEN_HOME): cxg copies the template there, generates go.mod, runs go mod tidy and builds. The entry is keyed by the template’s content, so an unchanged template reuses its binary offline, and it is renamed into place only after a successful build. The operator’s Go environment (GOPATH, GOMODCACHE, GOCACHE, GOFLAGS, GOPROXY, GOTOOLCHAIN) is inherited; with downloads disabled or unreachable the run fails fast as errored, naming the imports and how to make them available.

    The build no longer spends the probe’s --timeout: templates gain an optional Template::prepare phase, which the executor runs first under its own budget (300s, or --timeout if larger), and the Go engine compiles there. A cold first build of grpc-reflection-abuse takes ~30s on an empty Go cache and previously read as timed-out at the default 30s. Go build subprocesses are now killed when their budget expires instead of outliving it.

    Stdlib-only templates and templates inside a module build as before, except that the build now runs in the template’s own directory, so an enclosing module is the one Go uses rather than whatever module cxg was launched from.

Security

  • Dependency advisories addressed. cryptography is bumped 49.0.0 → 50.0.0 in pentest/requirements.txt (GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5), and rustls 0.23.41 → 0.23.45 (GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc), which carries aws-lc-rs, aws-lc-sys and rustls-webpki forward with it. cxg does not terminate TLS as a server, so the rustls advisory does not describe a code path cxg exercises; the bump keeps the tree current regardless.

  • Known open advisories, carried deliberately. Two transitive advisories are left for a later release because resolving them is not a version bump: idna (reachable through the DNS stack, which needs the trust-dns → hickory migration to move off the affected line) and rmcp (whose fix is the 2.x major, an API break). Both are named here so a reader of this release knows they are unaddressed rather than unnoticed.

Documentation and infrastructure

  • Security-contact and crate-homepage metadata, pull-request CI spend, and the vendored guardlink @flows conformance corpus were updated since 1.4.0; none change runtime behaviour.

1.6.0

Upgrading from 1.5.0 — read this first

The pentest pipeline refreshes itself after the binary upgrade. cxg pentest runs a Python pipeline that an earlier binary materialised under ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest/. Before this release, upgrading the binary left that copy untouched, so an upgraded cxg kept running the previous release’s pipeline until someone ran cxg pentest install --force.

From 1.6.0, the first pentest action after upgrading (a run, an auth command or capabilities) checks the installed files against the new binary’s embedded bundle and refreshes them offline. A 1.5.0 installation has no content manifest and is refreshed on that first action. To refresh deliberately instead, run cxg pentest update (add --json for a machine-readable result); cxg pentest status --json reports freshness without changing anything. Every replacement saves the entire previous tree, including local edits and added files, under ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest-backups/; auth profiles, sessions and template stores are not touched. Refresh does not run pip or install browsers, so new Python dependencies still need the usual setup. An installation that records a source checkout as its origin, or a shell with CXG_SOURCE set, is never replaced automatically: use cxg pentest update --from-embedded to opt in. A 1.5.0 client takes no execution lease, so upgrade between runs rather than while one is in progress. See the pentest upgrade guide.

Fewer findings reach confirmed, on purpose. A generated template can no longer confirm its own finding: confirmed: true, evidence.outcome: "confirmed" or reflection-only evidence is no longer enough. A finding is confirmed only on a class-appropriate signal the engine itself observed. Without one it is held as unverified (the probe ran but proved nothing) or unsupported (cxg has no oracle for the class). A run that confirmed a finding on 1.5.0 can report it as unverified on 1.6.0 against the same target; that is the intended change, not a regression. See “Proof contract” under Changed.

Added

  • Exact GuardLink threat selection: cxg pentest run --threat-id gl-… confines JS generation on web/Electron to imported hypotheses carrying that exact id. Selection precedes dedupe/ranking; unrelated discovery, boundary, desktop-surface and host probes are disabled. Missing ids refuse with exit 4 before target contact. Reports retain selected/excluded hypotheses in threat_selection; scope authorization remains mandatory and unchanged. cxg pentest capabilities returns the installed orchestrator’s JSON capability list, including exact-threat-id.
  • No-login / anonymous pentests are first-class. Empty --auth now runs real unauthenticated probing on a clean anonymous surface, without requesting interactive capture. Templates declaring requires_auth_count=0 are runnable without a login. Reports add auth_mode (anonymous, mixed, or authenticated) and auth_skipped; auth-only checks are recorded as not-run when their authenticated context is unavailable, instead of halting the run or being silently refuted. All existing authentication and safety gates remain in force, including strict named-profile loading, scope/host containment, CI dead-session checks, the two-identity IDOR premise, and proof oracles.
  • cxg pentest run --target-type tauri --tauri-prove proves Tauri IPC commands in process. After mapping the IPC surface, cxg copies the app, injects a #[cfg(test)] probe module into the file that already holds the app’s tauri::generate_handler! (so the same command paths and imports — including private commands — are in scope), enables Tauri’s test crate feature, and drives each ranked command through tauri::test::get_ipc_response with hostile arguments on a headless MockRuntime — no webview, no network. A deterministic prober generates the arguments from each command’s parameter shape (a ../-chain against a planted sentinel for path parameters; privileged-vs-benign values for authorization parameters) and a conservative oracle classifies each into the existing finding model: confirmed only on definitive evidence (the sentinel’s content came back; a privileged value succeeded where every benign value was rejected), refuted when the handler rejected the hostile argument, unevaluated otherwise. A command the harness cannot drive (it does not compile, or exposes no probeable argument) is listed under tauri_skipped_commands with a reason — never refuted. Needs a Rust toolchain; --tauri-prove-timeout bounds the build+run. Without the flag, a tauri run stays the source-surface map.
  • cxg pentest run --target-type tauri maps a Tauri app’s IPC surface from source. A new target type reads the Rust side of a Tauri application — every #[tauri::command] handler, its registration in tauri::generate_handler! (resolving module-path-qualified names and a const array of command identifiers, and honouring #[tauri::command(rename = "…")] for the invokable command name), and the capabilities/*.json grants plus the security-relevant tauri.conf.json fields — and emits one ipc://<command> hypothesis per command, correlating them against the guardlink threat model exactly as the Electron channel surface does. It is a source-surface map, not a live probe: a Tauri app exposes no CDP endpoint on macOS or Linux, so cxg cannot drive its webview the way it drives an Electron renderer. The run writes a report.json with status: "tauri_surface_mapped", the command surface under tauri_ipc_surface, the capability grants under tauri_capabilities, and an enumerated_not_live_probed caveat stating plainly that no command was confirmed or refuted. --target is not required for this target type (it never navigates anywhere). Proving a command exploitable in-process is a separate, following step.
  • cxg pentest can authenticate to header/apikey-gated APIs. An auth profile’s per-identity extra_headers (set with cxg pentest auth login|import --header NAME:VALUE, serialised under the extra_headers key in ~/.cert-x-gen/auth/<profile>.meta.json) are now sent on every request cxg issues for that identity — both the in-browser fetch path and the out-of-browser raw (Playwright request) path, where they previously were not, so a target that gates on a static apikey/Authorization header (for example a self-hosted Supabase gateway) is now authenticated on cxg.raw/cxg.rawAs probes as well as in-browser ones. A template’s own per-request header of the same name (matched case-insensitively) still wins. Header values are treated as credentials and never logged.
  • Headers-only (cookieless) auth profiles. An apikey/bearer-gated identity has no capturable cookie session; cxg pentest auth import --profile <name> --target <url> --header NAME:VALUE (with no --storage-state) now writes a headers-only profile — a <name>.meta.json with extra_headers and no <name>.json. It loads under --auth <name> without the “auth profile could not be loaded” error that previously halted every probe against such a target, opening an unauthenticated browser context that still presents the headers.
  • Engine oracles for SQL injection. cxg.sqli gives templates two engine-side oracles. The time-blind oracle samples baseline, injected-delay and zero-delay control latencies and confirms only when the injected delay is clearly separated from both. The extraction oracle confirms only when a database-computed, non-sensitive marker absent from the control is read back through a bounded UNION or error channel. Both SQL-injection classes now confirm only on these observations, never on reflection or a template’s own verdict.
  • Clickjacking is proven by an observed action, not by frameability. Under --attacker-origin, cxg.attacker.clickjack frames the target cross-origin, overlays a decoy on a real control, clicks through it and confirms only when the underlying action fires. A page that merely renders in a frame is held as unverified.
  • Sandbox-gated oracles for destructive classes. File-upload-to-RCE, GraphQL amplification, brute-force and credential stuffing run, and can confirm, only under an authorized-sandbox gate: --destructive-ok and a loopback/localhost target. Outside the gate they are reported unsupported with the missing half named, and the probe never runs. Upload-RCE confirms only on an observed execution callback, not on the upload being accepted; GraphQL amplification confirms on a measured response blow-up and states the factor; brute-force results are bounded by the configured attempt count. Race/TOCTOU confirms on an observed state readback and is not sandbox-gated.
  • cxg pentest update and cxg pentest status. update [--json] [--from-embedded] makes the installed pipeline match this binary’s embedded bundle offline, backing up the previous tree; status [--json] reports freshness read-only and works without Python. install and install --force share the same installer. Runs and updates coordinate through a lease on ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest.lock, so an update never replaces files under a running pipeline. The bundle’s manifest is derived from the packaged files at build time.

Changed

  • Proof contract. A finding is promoted to confirmed only through a per-class proof predicate that reads engine-written evidence. A registered class whose signal is absent is held as unverified; a class with no predicate is held as unsupported. The engine discards template-supplied copies of its reserved evidence keys, so a template cannot forge them. The unreachable, dispatch_failed and blocked checks run before any verdict. An XSS dialog counts as execution only if its message carries the payload marker. See pentest/docs/TEMPLATES.md.
  • OAuth, OIDC and SAML findings are held at unverified. The previous OAuth forgery differential could not distinguish a vulnerable flow from a safe one and was removed, so no finding in these classes reaches confirmed. Cross-host identity-provider traffic remains blocked by the scope rule.

Fixed

  • cxg no longer overflows the main-thread stack on Windows at startup. Building the full command tree could abort even cxg --help with 0xC00000FD in debug builds. Argument parsing and dispatch now run on a dedicated thread with an explicit 8 MiB stack on every platform, with exit codes and panics carried back unchanged.

Documentation and infrastructure

  • The README, docs/USAGE_GUIDE.md, pentest/README.md and the built-in --help text describe CLI baseline scanning and Tauri testing: what the source map establishes, what --tauri-prove adds, and the limits of a mock-runtime proof.
  • The release and CI build jobs retry the artifact upload once after a pause, so a transient artifact-service timeout on one runner no longer fails a whole release.

1.6.1

Fixed

  • cxg update failed on Homebrew installs with Update failed: IoError: No such file or directory (os error 2) at “Replacing binary file…”. Homebrew links bin/cxg -> ../Cellar/cxg/<version>/bin/cxg, and the replacement step resolved that relative link target against the current working directory rather than the link’s own directory, so it failed from everywhere except bin/ itself. macOS reports the symlink as the running executable, so that is where it showed; a plain-file install was not affected. The replacement now follows the link to an absolute path.

    1.5.0 and 1.6.0 still run their own updater, so cxg update on those releases cannot pick up this fix. Upgrade once through your package manager (brew upgrade cxg, cargo install cert-x-gen --force, or pulling the new image with docker pull ghcr.io/bugb-technologies/cert-x-gen:latest) or with a fresh download from the releases page.

Changed

  • cxg update no longer replaces a binary that a package manager owns. A cxg in a Homebrew Cellar, in cargo’s bin directory, or inside a container prints the command that upgrades it through its manager (brew upgrade cxg, cargo install cert-x-gen --force, docker pull …) and exits with status 3. --force replaces the file anyway.
  • cxg update verifies the downloaded binary against the release’s SHA256SUMS before replacing anything, and refuses a release without one.
  • cxg update no longer installs or refreshes detection templates on the way.

1.7.0

Upgrading

After upgrading an existing installation, run cxg pentest install --force. This release changes the Python pentest pipeline embedded in the binary. Replacing the binary alone does not replace the materialized files under ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest/; the explicit install refreshes them before your next run. The automatic freshness check introduced in 1.6.0 also refreshes ordinary embedded installations on their first pentest action, but source-checkout installations and CXG_SOURCE overrides keep their selected source. See the pipeline upgrade guide for source installations, backups and dependency setup. The pipeline adds the pinned h2 Python dependency for HTTP/2 race transport; without it, races use the HTTP/1.1 fallback.

Report consumers must handle explicit proof and coverage outcomes. Findings now include model_vuln_class, triage, triage_reason, reason_kind and proof_status. Reports add inconclusive_refusal, not_run and, on completed JavaScript runs, mutation_outcome. A refusal without a successful entitled control is no longer a verified mitigation. proof_status is one of proven, unverified or unsupported; unsupported checks may have sent requests without having an oracle able to prove the class. An empty confirmed findings list is not evidence that every check ran or every control held.

Added

More vulnerability classes and engine-owned proof

  • User enumeration, IP-header bypass and business-logic checks now have canonical class names, generation guidance, validation and engine-owned proof oracles. Enumeration compares repeated known-account and absent-account responses; IP-header bypass compares a refused baseline with a permitted spoofed-header request; business-logic proof reads back a server-side invariant through a distinct observer identity.
  • Response-observable and in-band proof oracles for server-side template injection, command injection, SSRF, XXE, path traversal, open redirects, credentialed CORS and mass assignment. cxg.oracle checks engine-observed computed markers, content, redirect destinations, browser-readable responses or persisted changes, with class-specific controls. Reflection and template-authored verdicts cannot substitute for those observations.
  • Boolean-blind SQL injection proof through cxg.sqli.boolean, complementing the existing timing and extraction oracles with repeated true/false response comparisons and controls.
  • A built-in, pollable OAST listener through --oast-listener, for targets that can reach the operator but have no internet egress. Bind to the Docker bridge, Docker Desktop host or an explicit address; optionally add DNS with --oast-listener-dns. SSRF redirect staging supports 302/307 responses and configurable destinations, with redirect visits retained in evidence. DNS rebinding support answers successive A queries with configured addresses and TTL zero. Staging a redirect alone never confirms a vulnerability.

Authentication and multi-identity probes

  • Mail, TOTP and operator input primitives: cxg.mail.latest reads matching messages over IMAP, cxg.totp generates codes from private per-identity seed slots, and cxg.ask waits for an operator answer through a bounded file exchange. Configure mail and questions with --auth-inputs; templates declare the mail, totp and ask capabilities. Seeds stay outside the page, and missing inputs are explicit errors or scheduling skips.
  • Named identity requirements let templates select more than two captured profiles using // @requires_identities: (a role-to-profile mapping). cxg.pageAs(idx) drives another loaded identity’s DOM in its own browser context. DOM XSS probes support POST navigation and cxg.page.watchXss observes execution across navigation and interactions without reloading the page.
  • Wire-learned auth material records credentials from the target’s own traffic rather than relying only on preselected storage keys, improving bearer-token and credential discovery.

Transport reach and reproductions

  • Web TLS, proxy and mutual TLS configuration: --insecure-tls, --proxy, --client-cert and --client-key apply to browser contexts, raw HTTP and profile inspection. Navigation to a dead target is rejected instead of continuing on an unusable page.
  • Single-connection raw socket scripts through cxg.socket.exchange, with ordered send, delimiter-read and timed-read operations for protocols requiring multi-step exchanges. The existing --allow-raw-socket and scope gates still apply.
  • Scripted WebSocket exchanges support subprotocols, ordered send/expect operations and binary frames. cxg.attacker.ws opens a WebSocket from the foreign attacker origin for cross-site WebSocket hijacking probes.
  • Opt-in HTTP captures: --capture-http writes redacted per-template traffic.har and repro.curl files for web JavaScript probes. Confirmed findings carry an endpoint-selected HAR slice and curl reproductions under evidence._cxg_http. Captures redact credentials; reproductions may need replacement credentials and replay individual requests.
  • Operator guidance and Crush support: --skills-file appends authoring guidance to generation and mutation prompts as untrusted advice. --ai-provider crush explicitly selects the Crush CLI; repository configuration requires --trust-repo-config or its environment equivalent. Auto provider selection is unchanged.

Changed

  • Refutation requires an observed control. A successful entitled identity and a distinct refused attacker identity must perform the same request in the same dispatch before it can enter mitigation_verifications. Missing controls, configuration refusals and Tauri refusals are recorded as inconclusive_refusal; transport errors and missing capabilities cannot establish that a control held. not_run records why generation or execution was unavailable, and mutation outcomes distinguish resolved, still ambiguous, missing rewrite and no-verdict results.
  • Cross-identity proof is tied to observed responses. IDOR and related authorization checks require distinct routed identities and an identifier observed in both response bodies. Credential-substitution proof requires engine-observed credential identifiers. Binary raw response bodies are preserved so non-text downloads can participate in overlap checks.
  • Race proof uses coordinated transport and independent readback. HTTP/2 races flush the terminating frames together on one connection; HTTP/1.1 uses last-byte synchronization. Dispatch timing alone cannot prove a race: the engine must read back the violated invariant.
  • Destructive proof can run on signed disposable remote targets. --destructive-ok still requires a disposable target; non-loopback staging hosts may now qualify through signed disposable_host_grants in the scope file. Brute-force proof also enforces the configured brute_force_min_attempts floor. A scope-file declaration without a valid signature cannot authorize destructive probes on a remote host.
  • Capability requirements can be combined. // @requires_capability: accepts multiple capabilities, and scheduling requires all of them. Generation prompts describe the engine’s actual proof contracts and supported class vocabulary; generated probes retain their hypothesis class, with a model’s different class retained separately as model_vuln_class.

Fixed

  • WAF, bot-challenge and rate-limit responses no longer imply verified application controls. HTTP interference is recorded in engine evidence and produces inconclusive outcomes. HTTP requests share pacing and 429 backoff across identities, honor Retry-After, and group opaque identifier path segments under the same endpoint budget. request_interval_seconds in the scope file controls minimum spacing; coordinated race batches remain atomic.
  • CSRF probes originate from a different site, preserving real SameSite behavior, and capture the form response for engine-observed proof instead of treating submission alone as success.
  • Mutation retries use the available AI provider chain and retain terminal generation failures in coverage reporting rather than silently dropping unresolved probes.

1.8.0

Upgrading

After upgrading an existing installation, run cxg pentest install --force. The embedded Python pentest pipeline changes in this release, and replacing the binary alone does not replace the files under ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest/. The pinned h2 dependency moves to 4.4.1, which drops Python 3.9.

Plain cxg scan now runs supplied JS probes. A directory or file that holds JS probe contracts is run through the pentest engine with zero model calls, alongside scanner templates. The combined JSON report keeps a template’s own verdict apart from the engine’s adjudicated verdict. --no-author is accepted on plain scan. It requires supplied probes, skips ranking and generation, and records zero model calls. Missing, empty or wholly invalid inputs are refused instead of generated.

Report consumers:

  • Scanner summaries split declared and inferred verdicts; engine-adjudicated rows keep their own count.
  • When subprocess traffic makes the total unknown, network_requests_measured carries the observed part and network_requests is null.
  • Discovery outcomes (skipped helpers, YAML load errors) are kept, and an all-invalid directory still writes a report.

Templates without a capability header are no longer rejected. The required capabilities are derived from the namespaces a template uses, with a warning. Unsupported capabilities are still skipped, and raw fetch and ipcRenderer bypasses are still rejected.

Added

  • cxg scan --pentest is a front door to the pentest engine. It accepts every pentest run option through shared argument definitions, and refuses scan options that don’t apply.
  • Opt-in scan CI gates: --fail-on confirmed,errored,timed-out (repeatable or comma-separated) exits 2 when a run reaches a listed status. The default exit behaviour is unchanged.
  • Engine proof for unauthenticated protected reads. A declared protected GET reads as:
    • confirmed when guest and authenticated responses match;
    • refuted when the authenticated read returns content and the guest gets 401, 403 or a login redirect;
    • inconclusive otherwise. This covers auth_api, missing_authentication (alias missing-authn) and protected metrics reads. The guest is a fresh context with no credentials.
  • Engine refutation for authorization regressions. In the same dispatch, an entitled 2xx plus a distinct attacker denial for the same method-qualified endpoint (such as GET /tasks) can be refuted. Missing, redirected or interfering controls read as inconclusive_refusal.
  • Fired-oracle routing. When a finding’s declared class can’t prove it, the engine routes through exactly one proven, request-bound oracle and keeps the original claim as provenance. Injection and file-inclusion aliases resolve before proof lookup. Forged stamps and ambiguous sibling matches can’t promote a finding.
  • --auth-dir for auth capture and listing, as well as import and verify. CERT_X_GEN_HOME is honoured for Python state.

Changed

  • Every engine HTTP request is audited: landing, inspection, health, reauthentication and identity checks, including redirects. Each audit row records the actor and purpose.
  • A reserved anonymous role binds to a separate clean guest. A credentialed saved profile named anonymous never stands in for it.
  • Python helper bytecode writes are disabled during scans.
  • Pull-request CI is two jobs: Rust (fmt, clippy, tests) and Python (pytest). Windows, Python 3.12, macOS and build jobs run on main and tags.

Fixed

  • Malformed HTTP probe calls, such as cxg.fetch({method, path}), are rejected as authoring errors. Load-time checks catch literal mistakes; runtime checks reject computed arguments before scope accounting or network dispatch and record the template as rejected. The loopback regression tests now declare their pinned aiohttp dependency.
  • HTTP argument and scope checks preserve empty paths, target URL prefixes, initial in-scope URL authentication, and ordinary JavaScript writers and aliases of engine primitives. URL credentials are removed on cross-origin raw redirects, alongside identity headers and cookies.
  • Pentest raw HTTP redirects now pass scope checks, request budgets, pacing, and auditing at every hop, including redirected methods. Out-of-scope hops stop before dispatch. Cross-origin hops discard identity headers and use a fresh cookie jar; maxRedirects: 0 still returns the original redirect response.
  • An explicit pentest method_allowlist now refuses every method outside the list, including POST and arbitrary extension methods. --destructive-ok no longer overrides an explicit list. Destructive path consent and the built-in defaults when no method list is declared retain their existing behavior.
  • cxg.fetch and cxg.fetchAs check the resolved destination host before sending requests. Probe validation rejects native network API references, aliases, dynamic imports, and script injection, directing authors to engine primitives. Source validation remains a backstop rather than a JavaScript sandbox; see the browser traffic limitations.
  • Captured auth storage-state files are written with mode 0600, and existing ones are tightened before re-capture.
  • Raw HTTP redirects pass every scope check at every hop: budget, pacing, method and canonical path. An out-of-scope hop stops before dispatch.
  • Directory scans don’t execute helpers, and don’t infer a refutation after a native transport failure. The shipped {{BaseURL}} request form executes.
  • The crate compiles again after duplicate CLI and template declarations were removed.

1.9.0

Upgrading

After upgrading an existing installation, run cxg pentest install --force. The embedded Python pentest pipeline changes in this release, and replacing the binary alone does not replace the files under ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest/.

Session liveness is now an authenticated API check, not a landing page. Capture, cxg pentest auth verify, scan pre-flight and runtime health all call one API endpoint on each profile’s own service. It defaults to /api/me and expects a 2xx; 401 and 403 always mean dead. If your application has no /api/me, its sessions now read as unverified: configure a real authenticated endpoint with --me-path, or per profile with auth import --liveness-path. --skip-health-check now skips only periodic health checks and re-authentication. It no longer bypasses the startup API check. See API session liveness and multiple services.

Request paths resolve at the service origin. fetch, fetchAs, raw, rawAs and cxg.url no longer inherit a path from a landing --target such as https://app.example/dashboard. The landing URL is still used for browser navigation. Templates that relied on the implicit prefix must name their API prefix explicitly.

Report consumers:

  • report.json and the audit footer carry profile_liveness (profile, service, origin, alive, status code, reason) and services with ready/unavailable status.
  • Exit 5 means a selected profile or service is unavailable or unverified. Probes for ready services still run, but the report is complete: false, status: incomplete.
  • Scope and transport failures are recorded in request_failures and make the run incomplete with exit 4, even when a probe returns no findings.

Added

  • Engine-owned excluded-records oracle (cxg.oracle.excludedRecords). It can refute a correct row-filtering fix. Such a fix keeps answering 200, so the refusal-control rule had nothing to observe and the fixed state stayed inconclusive. The engine issues three read-only GETs, each with its identity’s own credentials: the subject list as the attacker, the attacker’s own scoped list, and a reference list as a different identity. It compares records by key:

    • confirmed when a subject record outside the attacker’s list carries a reference value;
    • refuted (proven) when the subject is non-empty and wholly inside the attacker’s list, the reference is non-empty, and both sessions were proven alive in the same run;
    • inconclusive otherwise, naming the cause.

    The verdict binds to the finding’s endpoint and applies only to cross-identity classes. It never overturns a proven confirmation and cannot be forged from template evidence. Generation prompt v8 documents it.

  • Per-profile service and liveness settings on cxg pentest auth import: --service, --liveness-path and repeatable --liveness-status. Captures and imports save them as liveness_check: {path, expected_status}, and existing liveness_path metadata still loads.

  • Multi-service runs. Each profile opens its own service. Cross-origin cxg.fetchAs uses that identity’s API request context, so a second service no longer fails on CORS. Scope, budgets, redirects and audit still apply at every hop.

Changed

  • A denial verdict needs proof that both sessions were alive. Attacker and control liveness must come from the same run and service. Otherwise the result is inconclusive_refusal, naming the unverified profiles. An expired session can no longer be recorded as a verified mitigation.
  • One unavailable profile no longer cancels the run. Profiles keep their roster indices, only the probes that need an unavailable profile are skipped, and other services continue.
  • When an oracle observation cannot bind to a finding, triage names the measured request and the claimed endpoint. It no longer reports that the oracle saw no signal.

Fixed

  • Oracle proofs bind to findings on dynamic paths such as GET /users/{username}. Every SQLi and class-oracle router keeps the original request URL beside the substituted one. Binding accepts {param}, :param, <param> and <type:param>, but a parameter never spans more than one segment. Method, origin, query and sibling-uniqueness checks are unchanged.
  • A public landing page can no longer make an expired bearer session look alive. Redirects, HTML fallbacks and missing endpoints do not count as liveness.
  • The HTTP/2 race transport keeps reading responses already queued by a closing peer when an acknowledgment write fails. Previously those responses could be lost as all-zero statuses.

1.9.1

Upgrading

After upgrading an existing installation, run cxg pentest install --force. The fix below is in the embedded Python pentest pipeline, and replacing the binary alone does not replace the files under ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest/.

Fixed

  • cxg.oracle.excludedRecords verdicts bind when the scope has a path. With a landing scope such as --scope http://host/dashboard, the oracle measured /api/x at the service origin while the finding claimed /dashboard/api/x, so a correct row-filtering fix came back inconclusive_refusal (unverified) instead of refuted (proven), and a leak was not confirmed by the oracle. The claim is now resolved at the service origin, the way the oracle’s requests are, through both cxg scan and cxg pentest run. The other class oracles build their requests from the full --target, so their claims already bound and are unchanged.
  • cxg pentest run --help described 1.8.0 session behaviour. It said a dead session only warns without --ci and that --skip-health-check force-marks profiles alive. Since 1.9.0 an expired profile exits 5 with or without either flag, and probes for ready services still run. The --ci, --skip-health-check and exit-code 5 help now say so, and --ci reads as what it still does: refuse a world-accessible --auth-dir.

[1.9.2] Latest

Upgrading

After upgrading an existing installation, run cxg pentest install --force. These fixes are in the embedded Python pentest pipeline. cxg scan refreshes it on first use.

Fixed

  • A profile is no longer unverified, and the run no longer exits 5, because the app has no JSON /api/me. When no liveness endpoint is configured and /api/me answers 404, HTML, a redirect or nothing, the 1.8.0 landing test decides; a configured endpoint, or an /api/me answering 401/403, still decides as in 1.9.x. Remaining 1.8.0 hole: an app with no API liveness endpoint, a public landing page and an expired bearer reads as alive.
  • A supplied-probe replay drops --auth names with no loadable profile, as 1.8.0 did, so one missing profile no longer makes every kit, including anonymous ones, exit 5.
  • Identity traffic and liveness go to the --scope target again. A profile’s saved --target origin is used only for a profile imported with --service; 1.9.x sent a stale profile’s requests to another port while the verdict was recorded against the scope.
  • Request helpers keep the --scope path prefix again, so cxg.fetch/raw/url and cxg.page.probeXss agree under a scope such as http://host/app/ and an XSS that 1.8.0 confirmed confirms. cxg.oracle.excludedRecords still resolves at the origin.
  • A complete run reports status: "ok", not "complete", so a consumer that treats any status other than ok as a caveat no longer reports one; incomplete is unchanged.
  • A blocked or failed request no longer changes the exit code to 4. It is still recorded in request_failures and makes the run status: incomplete.