cxg changelog
Version 1.7.0
Upgrading
After upgrading an existing installation, run cxg pentest install --force. This
release changes the Python pentest pipeline embedded in the binary. Replacing the binary
alone does not replace the materialized files under ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest/; the explicit
install refreshes them before your next run. The automatic freshness check introduced in
1.6.0 also refreshes ordinary embedded installations on their first pentest action, but
source-checkout installations and CXG_SOURCE overrides keep their selected source. See
the pipeline upgrade guide for source
installations, backups and dependency setup. The pipeline adds the pinned h2 Python
dependency for HTTP/2 race transport; without it, races use the HTTP/1.1 fallback.
Report consumers must handle explicit proof and coverage outcomes. Findings now include
model_vuln_class, triage, triage_reason, reason_kind and proof_status. Reports add
inconclusive_refusal, not_run and, on completed JavaScript runs, mutation_outcome.
A refusal without a successful entitled control is no longer a verified mitigation.
proof_status is one of proven, unverified or unsupported; unsupported checks may
have sent requests without having an oracle able to prove the class. An empty confirmed
findings list is not evidence that every check ran or every control held.
Added
More vulnerability classes and engine-owned proof
- User enumeration, IP-header bypass and business-logic checks now have canonical class names, generation guidance, validation and engine-owned proof oracles. Enumeration compares repeated known-account and absent-account responses; IP-header bypass compares a refused baseline with a permitted spoofed-header request; business-logic proof reads back a server-side invariant through a distinct observer identity.
- Response-observable and in-band proof oracles for server-side template injection,
command injection, SSRF, XXE, path traversal, open redirects, credentialed CORS and mass
assignment.
cxg.oraclechecks engine-observed computed markers, content, redirect destinations, browser-readable responses or persisted changes, with class-specific controls. Reflection and template-authored verdicts cannot substitute for those observations. - Boolean-blind SQL injection proof through
cxg.sqli.boolean, complementing the existing timing and extraction oracles with repeated true/false response comparisons and controls. - A built-in, pollable OAST listener through
--oast-listener, for targets that can reach the operator but have no internet egress. Bind to the Docker bridge, Docker Desktop host or an explicit address; optionally add DNS with--oast-listener-dns. SSRF redirect staging supports 302/307 responses and configurable destinations, with redirect visits retained in evidence. DNS rebinding support answers successive A queries with configured addresses and TTL zero. Staging a redirect alone never confirms a vulnerability.
Authentication and multi-identity probes
- Mail, TOTP and operator input primitives:
cxg.mail.latestreads matching messages over IMAP,cxg.totpgenerates codes from private per-identity seed slots, andcxg.askwaits for an operator answer through a bounded file exchange. Configure mail and questions with--auth-inputs; templates declare themail,totpandaskcapabilities. Seeds stay outside the page, and missing inputs are explicit errors or scheduling skips. - Named identity requirements let templates select more than two captured profiles using
// @requires_identities:(a role-to-profile mapping).cxg.pageAs(idx)drives another loaded identity’s DOM in its own browser context. DOM XSS probes support POST navigation andcxg.page.watchXssobserves execution across navigation and interactions without reloading the page. - Wire-learned auth material records credentials from the target’s own traffic rather than relying only on preselected storage keys, improving bearer-token and credential discovery.
Transport reach and reproductions
- Web TLS, proxy and mutual TLS configuration:
--insecure-tls,--proxy,--client-certand--client-keyapply to browser contexts, raw HTTP and profile inspection. Navigation to a dead target is rejected instead of continuing on an unusable page. - Single-connection raw socket scripts through
cxg.socket.exchange, with ordered send, delimiter-read and timed-read operations for protocols requiring multi-step exchanges. The existing--allow-raw-socketand scope gates still apply. - Scripted WebSocket exchanges support subprotocols, ordered send/expect operations and
binary frames.
cxg.attacker.wsopens a WebSocket from the foreign attacker origin for cross-site WebSocket hijacking probes. - Opt-in HTTP captures:
--capture-httpwrites redacted per-templatetraffic.harandrepro.curlfiles for web JavaScript probes. Confirmed findings carry an endpoint-selected HAR slice and curl reproductions underevidence._cxg_http. Captures redact credentials; reproductions may need replacement credentials and replay individual requests. - Operator guidance and Crush support:
--skills-fileappends authoring guidance to generation and mutation prompts as untrusted advice.--ai-provider crushexplicitly selects the Crush CLI; repository configuration requires--trust-repo-configor its environment equivalent. Auto provider selection is unchanged.
Changed
- Refutation requires an observed control. A successful entitled identity and a distinct
refused attacker identity must perform the same request in the same dispatch before it can
enter
mitigation_verifications. Missing controls, configuration refusals and Tauri refusals are recorded asinconclusive_refusal; transport errors and missing capabilities cannot establish that a control held.not_runrecords why generation or execution was unavailable, and mutation outcomes distinguish resolved, still ambiguous, missing rewrite and no-verdict results. - Cross-identity proof is tied to observed responses. IDOR and related authorization checks require distinct routed identities and an identifier observed in both response bodies. Credential-substitution proof requires engine-observed credential identifiers. Binary raw response bodies are preserved so non-text downloads can participate in overlap checks.
- Race proof uses coordinated transport and independent readback. HTTP/2 races flush the terminating frames together on one connection; HTTP/1.1 uses last-byte synchronization. Dispatch timing alone cannot prove a race: the engine must read back the violated invariant.
- Destructive proof can run on signed disposable remote targets.
--destructive-okstill requires a disposable target; non-loopback staging hosts may now qualify through signeddisposable_host_grantsin the scope file. Brute-force proof also enforces the configuredbrute_force_min_attemptsfloor. A scope-file declaration without a valid signature cannot authorize destructive probes on a remote host. - Capability requirements can be combined.
// @requires_capability:accepts multiple capabilities, and scheduling requires all of them. Generation prompts describe the engine’s actual proof contracts and supported class vocabulary; generated probes retain their hypothesis class, with a model’s different class retained separately asmodel_vuln_class.
Fixed
- WAF, bot-challenge and rate-limit responses no longer imply verified application controls.
HTTP interference is recorded in engine evidence and produces inconclusive outcomes. HTTP
requests share pacing and 429 backoff across identities, honor
Retry-After, and group opaque identifier path segments under the same endpoint budget.request_interval_secondsin the scope file controls minimum spacing; coordinated race batches remain atomic. - CSRF probes originate from a different site, preserving real SameSite behavior, and capture the form response for engine-observed proof instead of treating submission alone as success.
- Mutation retries use the available AI provider chain and retain terminal generation failures in coverage reporting rather than silently dropping unresolved probes.

