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cxg changelog

Version 1.7.0

Upgrading

After upgrading an existing installation, run cxg pentest install --force. This release changes the Python pentest pipeline embedded in the binary. Replacing the binary alone does not replace the materialized files under ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest/; the explicit install refreshes them before your next run. The automatic freshness check introduced in 1.6.0 also refreshes ordinary embedded installations on their first pentest action, but source-checkout installations and CXG_SOURCE overrides keep their selected source. See the pipeline upgrade guide for source installations, backups and dependency setup. The pipeline adds the pinned h2 Python dependency for HTTP/2 race transport; without it, races use the HTTP/1.1 fallback.

Report consumers must handle explicit proof and coverage outcomes. Findings now include model_vuln_class, triage, triage_reason, reason_kind and proof_status. Reports add inconclusive_refusal, not_run and, on completed JavaScript runs, mutation_outcome. A refusal without a successful entitled control is no longer a verified mitigation. proof_status is one of proven, unverified or unsupported; unsupported checks may have sent requests without having an oracle able to prove the class. An empty confirmed findings list is not evidence that every check ran or every control held.

Added

More vulnerability classes and engine-owned proof

  • User enumeration, IP-header bypass and business-logic checks now have canonical class names, generation guidance, validation and engine-owned proof oracles. Enumeration compares repeated known-account and absent-account responses; IP-header bypass compares a refused baseline with a permitted spoofed-header request; business-logic proof reads back a server-side invariant through a distinct observer identity.
  • Response-observable and in-band proof oracles for server-side template injection, command injection, SSRF, XXE, path traversal, open redirects, credentialed CORS and mass assignment. cxg.oracle checks engine-observed computed markers, content, redirect destinations, browser-readable responses or persisted changes, with class-specific controls. Reflection and template-authored verdicts cannot substitute for those observations.
  • Boolean-blind SQL injection proof through cxg.sqli.boolean, complementing the existing timing and extraction oracles with repeated true/false response comparisons and controls.
  • A built-in, pollable OAST listener through --oast-listener, for targets that can reach the operator but have no internet egress. Bind to the Docker bridge, Docker Desktop host or an explicit address; optionally add DNS with --oast-listener-dns. SSRF redirect staging supports 302/307 responses and configurable destinations, with redirect visits retained in evidence. DNS rebinding support answers successive A queries with configured addresses and TTL zero. Staging a redirect alone never confirms a vulnerability.

Authentication and multi-identity probes

  • Mail, TOTP and operator input primitives: cxg.mail.latest reads matching messages over IMAP, cxg.totp generates codes from private per-identity seed slots, and cxg.ask waits for an operator answer through a bounded file exchange. Configure mail and questions with --auth-inputs; templates declare the mail, totp and ask capabilities. Seeds stay outside the page, and missing inputs are explicit errors or scheduling skips.
  • Named identity requirements let templates select more than two captured profiles using // @requires_identities: (a role-to-profile mapping). cxg.pageAs(idx) drives another loaded identity’s DOM in its own browser context. DOM XSS probes support POST navigation and cxg.page.watchXss observes execution across navigation and interactions without reloading the page.
  • Wire-learned auth material records credentials from the target’s own traffic rather than relying only on preselected storage keys, improving bearer-token and credential discovery.

Transport reach and reproductions

  • Web TLS, proxy and mutual TLS configuration: --insecure-tls, --proxy, --client-cert and --client-key apply to browser contexts, raw HTTP and profile inspection. Navigation to a dead target is rejected instead of continuing on an unusable page.
  • Single-connection raw socket scripts through cxg.socket.exchange, with ordered send, delimiter-read and timed-read operations for protocols requiring multi-step exchanges. The existing --allow-raw-socket and scope gates still apply.
  • Scripted WebSocket exchanges support subprotocols, ordered send/expect operations and binary frames. cxg.attacker.ws opens a WebSocket from the foreign attacker origin for cross-site WebSocket hijacking probes.
  • Opt-in HTTP captures: --capture-http writes redacted per-template traffic.har and repro.curl files for web JavaScript probes. Confirmed findings carry an endpoint-selected HAR slice and curl reproductions under evidence._cxg_http. Captures redact credentials; reproductions may need replacement credentials and replay individual requests.
  • Operator guidance and Crush support: --skills-file appends authoring guidance to generation and mutation prompts as untrusted advice. --ai-provider crush explicitly selects the Crush CLI; repository configuration requires --trust-repo-config or its environment equivalent. Auto provider selection is unchanged.

Changed

  • Refutation requires an observed control. A successful entitled identity and a distinct refused attacker identity must perform the same request in the same dispatch before it can enter mitigation_verifications. Missing controls, configuration refusals and Tauri refusals are recorded as inconclusive_refusal; transport errors and missing capabilities cannot establish that a control held. not_run records why generation or execution was unavailable, and mutation outcomes distinguish resolved, still ambiguous, missing rewrite and no-verdict results.
  • Cross-identity proof is tied to observed responses. IDOR and related authorization checks require distinct routed identities and an identifier observed in both response bodies. Credential-substitution proof requires engine-observed credential identifiers. Binary raw response bodies are preserved so non-text downloads can participate in overlap checks.
  • Race proof uses coordinated transport and independent readback. HTTP/2 races flush the terminating frames together on one connection; HTTP/1.1 uses last-byte synchronization. Dispatch timing alone cannot prove a race: the engine must read back the violated invariant.
  • Destructive proof can run on signed disposable remote targets. --destructive-ok still requires a disposable target; non-loopback staging hosts may now qualify through signed disposable_host_grants in the scope file. Brute-force proof also enforces the configured brute_force_min_attempts floor. A scope-file declaration without a valid signature cannot authorize destructive probes on a remote host.
  • Capability requirements can be combined. // @requires_capability: accepts multiple capabilities, and scheduling requires all of them. Generation prompts describe the engine’s actual proof contracts and supported class vocabulary; generated probes retain their hypothesis class, with a model’s different class retained separately as model_vuln_class.

Fixed

  • WAF, bot-challenge and rate-limit responses no longer imply verified application controls. HTTP interference is recorded in engine evidence and produces inconclusive outcomes. HTTP requests share pacing and 429 backoff across identities, honor Retry-After, and group opaque identifier path segments under the same endpoint budget. request_interval_seconds in the scope file controls minimum spacing; coordinated race batches remain atomic.
  • CSRF probes originate from a different site, preserving real SameSite behavior, and capture the form response for engine-observed proof instead of treating submission alone as success.
  • Mutation retries use the available AI provider chain and retain terminal generation failures in coverage reporting rather than silently dropping unresolved probes.