All versions since 1.7.0
1.7.0
Upgrading
After upgrading an existing installation, run cxg pentest install --force. This
release changes the Python pentest pipeline embedded in the binary. Replacing the binary
alone does not replace the materialized files under ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest/; the explicit
install refreshes them before your next run. The automatic freshness check introduced in
1.6.0 also refreshes ordinary embedded installations on their first pentest action, but
source-checkout installations and CXG_SOURCE overrides keep their selected source. See
the pipeline upgrade guide for source
installations, backups and dependency setup. The pipeline adds the pinned h2 Python
dependency for HTTP/2 race transport; without it, races use the HTTP/1.1 fallback.
Report consumers must handle explicit proof and coverage outcomes. Findings now include
model_vuln_class, triage, triage_reason, reason_kind and proof_status. Reports add
inconclusive_refusal, not_run and, on completed JavaScript runs, mutation_outcome.
A refusal without a successful entitled control is no longer a verified mitigation.
proof_status is one of proven, unverified or unsupported; unsupported checks may
have sent requests without having an oracle able to prove the class. An empty confirmed
findings list is not evidence that every check ran or every control held.
Added
More vulnerability classes and engine-owned proof
- User enumeration, IP-header bypass and business-logic checks now have canonical class names, generation guidance, validation and engine-owned proof oracles. Enumeration compares repeated known-account and absent-account responses; IP-header bypass compares a refused baseline with a permitted spoofed-header request; business-logic proof reads back a server-side invariant through a distinct observer identity.
- Response-observable and in-band proof oracles for server-side template injection,
command injection, SSRF, XXE, path traversal, open redirects, credentialed CORS and mass
assignment.
cxg.oraclechecks engine-observed computed markers, content, redirect destinations, browser-readable responses or persisted changes, with class-specific controls. Reflection and template-authored verdicts cannot substitute for those observations. - Boolean-blind SQL injection proof through
cxg.sqli.boolean, complementing the existing timing and extraction oracles with repeated true/false response comparisons and controls. - A built-in, pollable OAST listener through
--oast-listener, for targets that can reach the operator but have no internet egress. Bind to the Docker bridge, Docker Desktop host or an explicit address; optionally add DNS with--oast-listener-dns. SSRF redirect staging supports 302/307 responses and configurable destinations, with redirect visits retained in evidence. DNS rebinding support answers successive A queries with configured addresses and TTL zero. Staging a redirect alone never confirms a vulnerability.
Authentication and multi-identity probes
- Mail, TOTP and operator input primitives:
cxg.mail.latestreads matching messages over IMAP,cxg.totpgenerates codes from private per-identity seed slots, andcxg.askwaits for an operator answer through a bounded file exchange. Configure mail and questions with--auth-inputs; templates declare themail,totpandaskcapabilities. Seeds stay outside the page, and missing inputs are explicit errors or scheduling skips. - Named identity requirements let templates select more than two captured profiles using
// @requires_identities:(a role-to-profile mapping).cxg.pageAs(idx)drives another loaded identity’s DOM in its own browser context. DOM XSS probes support POST navigation andcxg.page.watchXssobserves execution across navigation and interactions without reloading the page. - Wire-learned auth material records credentials from the target’s own traffic rather than relying only on preselected storage keys, improving bearer-token and credential discovery.
Transport reach and reproductions
- Web TLS, proxy and mutual TLS configuration:
--insecure-tls,--proxy,--client-certand--client-keyapply to browser contexts, raw HTTP and profile inspection. Navigation to a dead target is rejected instead of continuing on an unusable page. - Single-connection raw socket scripts through
cxg.socket.exchange, with ordered send, delimiter-read and timed-read operations for protocols requiring multi-step exchanges. The existing--allow-raw-socketand scope gates still apply. - Scripted WebSocket exchanges support subprotocols, ordered send/expect operations and
binary frames.
cxg.attacker.wsopens a WebSocket from the foreign attacker origin for cross-site WebSocket hijacking probes. - Opt-in HTTP captures:
--capture-httpwrites redacted per-templatetraffic.harandrepro.curlfiles for web JavaScript probes. Confirmed findings carry an endpoint-selected HAR slice and curl reproductions underevidence._cxg_http. Captures redact credentials; reproductions may need replacement credentials and replay individual requests. - Operator guidance and Crush support:
--skills-fileappends authoring guidance to generation and mutation prompts as untrusted advice.--ai-provider crushexplicitly selects the Crush CLI; repository configuration requires--trust-repo-configor its environment equivalent. Auto provider selection is unchanged.
Changed
- Refutation requires an observed control. A successful entitled identity and a distinct
refused attacker identity must perform the same request in the same dispatch before it can
enter
mitigation_verifications. Missing controls, configuration refusals and Tauri refusals are recorded asinconclusive_refusal; transport errors and missing capabilities cannot establish that a control held.not_runrecords why generation or execution was unavailable, and mutation outcomes distinguish resolved, still ambiguous, missing rewrite and no-verdict results. - Cross-identity proof is tied to observed responses. IDOR and related authorization checks require distinct routed identities and an identifier observed in both response bodies. Credential-substitution proof requires engine-observed credential identifiers. Binary raw response bodies are preserved so non-text downloads can participate in overlap checks.
- Race proof uses coordinated transport and independent readback. HTTP/2 races flush the terminating frames together on one connection; HTTP/1.1 uses last-byte synchronization. Dispatch timing alone cannot prove a race: the engine must read back the violated invariant.
- Destructive proof can run on signed disposable remote targets.
--destructive-okstill requires a disposable target; non-loopback staging hosts may now qualify through signeddisposable_host_grantsin the scope file. Brute-force proof also enforces the configuredbrute_force_min_attemptsfloor. A scope-file declaration without a valid signature cannot authorize destructive probes on a remote host. - Capability requirements can be combined.
// @requires_capability:accepts multiple capabilities, and scheduling requires all of them. Generation prompts describe the engine’s actual proof contracts and supported class vocabulary; generated probes retain their hypothesis class, with a model’s different class retained separately asmodel_vuln_class.
Fixed
- WAF, bot-challenge and rate-limit responses no longer imply verified application controls.
HTTP interference is recorded in engine evidence and produces inconclusive outcomes. HTTP
requests share pacing and 429 backoff across identities, honor
Retry-After, and group opaque identifier path segments under the same endpoint budget.request_interval_secondsin the scope file controls minimum spacing; coordinated race batches remain atomic. - CSRF probes originate from a different site, preserving real SameSite behavior, and capture the form response for engine-observed proof instead of treating submission alone as success.
- Mutation retries use the available AI provider chain and retain terminal generation failures in coverage reporting rather than silently dropping unresolved probes.
1.8.0
Upgrading
After upgrading an existing installation, run cxg pentest install --force. The
embedded Python pentest pipeline changes in this release, and replacing the binary alone
does not replace the files under ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest/. The pinned h2 dependency moves
to 4.4.1, which drops Python 3.9.
Plain cxg scan now runs supplied JS probes. A directory or file that holds JS probe
contracts is run through the pentest engine with zero model calls, alongside scanner
templates. The combined JSON report keeps a template’s own verdict apart from the engine’s
adjudicated verdict. --no-author is accepted on plain scan. It requires supplied probes,
skips ranking and generation, and records zero model calls. Missing, empty or wholly invalid
inputs are refused instead of generated.
Report consumers:
- Scanner summaries split declared and inferred verdicts; engine-adjudicated rows keep their own count.
- When subprocess traffic makes the total unknown,
network_requests_measuredcarries the observed part andnetwork_requestsis null. - Discovery outcomes (skipped helpers, YAML load errors) are kept, and an all-invalid directory still writes a report.
Templates without a capability header are no longer rejected. The required
capabilities are derived from the namespaces a template uses, with a warning. Unsupported
capabilities are still skipped, and raw fetch and ipcRenderer bypasses are still rejected.
Added
cxg scan --pentestis a front door to the pentest engine. It accepts everypentest runoption through shared argument definitions, and refuses scan options that don’t apply.- Opt-in scan CI gates:
--fail-on confirmed,errored,timed-out(repeatable or comma-separated) exits 2 when a run reaches a listed status. The default exit behaviour is unchanged. - Engine proof for unauthenticated protected reads. A declared protected GET reads as:
- confirmed when guest and authenticated responses match;
- refuted when the authenticated read returns content and the guest gets 401, 403 or a login redirect;
- inconclusive otherwise.
This covers
auth_api,missing_authentication(aliasmissing-authn) and protected metrics reads. The guest is a fresh context with no credentials.
- Engine refutation for authorization regressions. In the same dispatch, an entitled 2xx plus a distinct attacker denial for the same method-qualified endpoint (such as
GET /tasks) can be refuted. Missing, redirected or interfering controls read asinconclusive_refusal. - Fired-oracle routing. When a finding’s declared class can’t prove it, the engine routes through exactly one proven, request-bound oracle and keeps the original claim as provenance. Injection and file-inclusion aliases resolve before proof lookup. Forged stamps and ambiguous sibling matches can’t promote a finding.
--auth-dirfor auth capture and listing, as well as import and verify.CERT_X_GEN_HOMEis honoured for Python state.
Changed
- Every engine HTTP request is audited: landing, inspection, health, reauthentication and identity checks, including redirects. Each audit row records the
actorandpurpose. - A reserved
anonymousrole binds to a separate clean guest. A credentialed saved profile namedanonymousnever stands in for it. - Python helper bytecode writes are disabled during scans.
- Pull-request CI is two jobs: Rust (fmt, clippy, tests) and Python (pytest). Windows, Python 3.12, macOS and build jobs run on main and tags.
Fixed
- Malformed HTTP probe calls, such as
cxg.fetch({method, path}), are rejected as authoring errors. Load-time checks catch literal mistakes; runtime checks reject computed arguments before scope accounting or network dispatch and record the template as rejected. The loopback regression tests now declare their pinned aiohttp dependency. - HTTP argument and scope checks preserve empty paths, target URL prefixes, initial in-scope URL authentication, and ordinary JavaScript writers and aliases of engine primitives. URL credentials are removed on cross-origin raw redirects, alongside identity headers and cookies.
- Pentest raw HTTP redirects now pass scope checks, request budgets, pacing, and
auditing at every hop, including redirected methods. Out-of-scope hops stop
before dispatch. Cross-origin hops discard identity headers and use a fresh
cookie jar;
maxRedirects: 0still returns the original redirect response. - An explicit pentest
method_allowlistnow refuses every method outside the list, including POST and arbitrary extension methods.--destructive-okno longer overrides an explicit list. Destructive path consent and the built-in defaults when no method list is declared retain their existing behavior. cxg.fetchandcxg.fetchAscheck the resolved destination host before sending requests. Probe validation rejects native network API references, aliases, dynamic imports, and script injection, directing authors to engine primitives. Source validation remains a backstop rather than a JavaScript sandbox; see the browser traffic limitations.- Captured auth storage-state files are written with mode 0600, and existing ones are tightened before re-capture.
- Raw HTTP redirects pass every scope check at every hop: budget, pacing, method and canonical path. An out-of-scope hop stops before dispatch.
- Directory scans don’t execute helpers, and don’t infer a refutation after a native transport failure. The shipped
{{BaseURL}}request form executes. - The crate compiles again after duplicate CLI and template declarations were removed.
1.9.0
Upgrading
After upgrading an existing installation, run cxg pentest install --force. The
embedded Python pentest pipeline changes in this release, and replacing the binary alone
does not replace the files under ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest/.
Session liveness is now an authenticated API check, not a landing page. Capture,
cxg pentest auth verify, scan pre-flight and runtime health all call one API endpoint
on each profile’s own service. It defaults to /api/me and expects a 2xx; 401 and 403
always mean dead. If your application has no /api/me, its sessions now read as
unverified: configure a real authenticated endpoint with --me-path, or per profile
with auth import --liveness-path. --skip-health-check now skips only periodic
health checks and re-authentication. It no longer bypasses the startup API check. See
API session liveness and multiple services.
Request paths resolve at the service origin. fetch, fetchAs, raw, rawAs and
cxg.url no longer inherit a path from a landing --target such as
https://app.example/dashboard. The landing URL is still used for browser navigation.
Templates that relied on the implicit prefix must name their API prefix explicitly.
Report consumers:
report.jsonand the audit footer carryprofile_liveness(profile, service, origin, alive, status code, reason) andserviceswithready/unavailablestatus.- Exit 5 means a selected profile or service is unavailable or unverified. Probes for ready services still run, but the report is
complete: false,status: incomplete. - Scope and transport failures are recorded in
request_failuresand make the run incomplete with exit 4, even when a probe returns no findings.
Added
-
Engine-owned excluded-records oracle (
cxg.oracle.excludedRecords). It can refute a correct row-filtering fix. Such a fix keeps answering 200, so the refusal-control rule had nothing to observe and the fixed state stayed inconclusive. The engine issues three read-only GETs, each with its identity’s own credentials: the subject list as the attacker, the attacker’s own scoped list, and a reference list as a different identity. It compares records by key:- confirmed when a subject record outside the attacker’s list carries a reference value;
- refuted (proven) when the subject is non-empty and wholly inside the attacker’s list, the reference is non-empty, and both sessions were proven alive in the same run;
- inconclusive otherwise, naming the cause.
The verdict binds to the finding’s endpoint and applies only to cross-identity classes. It never overturns a proven confirmation and cannot be forged from template evidence. Generation prompt v8 documents it.
-
Per-profile service and liveness settings on
cxg pentest auth import:--service,--liveness-pathand repeatable--liveness-status. Captures and imports save them asliveness_check: {path, expected_status}, and existingliveness_pathmetadata still loads. -
Multi-service runs. Each profile opens its own service. Cross-origin
cxg.fetchAsuses that identity’s API request context, so a second service no longer fails on CORS. Scope, budgets, redirects and audit still apply at every hop.
Changed
- A denial verdict needs proof that both sessions were alive. Attacker and control liveness must come from the same run and service. Otherwise the result is
inconclusive_refusal, naming the unverified profiles. An expired session can no longer be recorded as a verified mitigation. - One unavailable profile no longer cancels the run. Profiles keep their roster indices, only the probes that need an unavailable profile are skipped, and other services continue.
- When an oracle observation cannot bind to a finding, triage names the measured request and the claimed endpoint. It no longer reports that the oracle saw no signal.
Fixed
- Oracle proofs bind to findings on dynamic paths such as
GET /users/{username}. Every SQLi and class-oracle router keeps the original request URL beside the substituted one. Binding accepts{param},:param,<param>and<type:param>, but a parameter never spans more than one segment. Method, origin, query and sibling-uniqueness checks are unchanged. - A public landing page can no longer make an expired bearer session look alive. Redirects, HTML fallbacks and missing endpoints do not count as liveness.
- The HTTP/2 race transport keeps reading responses already queued by a closing peer when an acknowledgment write fails. Previously those responses could be lost as all-zero statuses.
1.9.1
Upgrading
After upgrading an existing installation, run cxg pentest install --force. The fix
below is in the embedded Python pentest pipeline, and replacing the binary alone does not
replace the files under ~/.cert-x-gen/pentest/.
Fixed
cxg.oracle.excludedRecordsverdicts bind when the scope has a path. With a landing scope such as--scope http://host/dashboard, the oracle measured/api/xat the service origin while the finding claimed/dashboard/api/x, so a correct row-filtering fix came backinconclusive_refusal(unverified) instead of refuted (proven), and a leak was not confirmed by the oracle. The claim is now resolved at the service origin, the way the oracle’s requests are, through bothcxg scanandcxg pentest run. The other class oracles build their requests from the full--target, so their claims already bound and are unchanged.cxg pentest run --helpdescribed 1.8.0 session behaviour. It said a dead session only warns without--ciand that--skip-health-checkforce-marks profiles alive. Since 1.9.0 an expired profile exits 5 with or without either flag, and probes for ready services still run. The--ci,--skip-health-checkand exit-code 5 help now say so, and--cireads as what it still does: refuse a world-accessible--auth-dir.
[1.9.2] Latest
Upgrading
After upgrading an existing installation, run cxg pentest install --force. These fixes
are in the embedded Python pentest pipeline. cxg scan refreshes it on first use.
Fixed
- A profile is no longer unverified, and the run no longer exits 5, because the app has no
JSON
/api/me. When no liveness endpoint is configured and/api/meanswers 404, HTML, a redirect or nothing, the 1.8.0 landing test decides; a configured endpoint, or an/api/meanswering 401/403, still decides as in 1.9.x. Remaining 1.8.0 hole: an app with no API liveness endpoint, a public landing page and an expired bearer reads as alive. - A supplied-probe replay drops
--authnames with no loadable profile, as 1.8.0 did, so one missing profile no longer makes every kit, including anonymous ones, exit 5. - Identity traffic and liveness go to the
--scopetarget again. A profile’s saved--targetorigin is used only for a profile imported with--service; 1.9.x sent a stale profile’s requests to another port while the verdict was recorded against the scope. - Request helpers keep the
--scopepath prefix again, socxg.fetch/raw/urlandcxg.page.probeXssagree under a scope such ashttp://host/app/and an XSS that 1.8.0 confirmed confirms.cxg.oracle.excludedRecordsstill resolves at the origin. - A complete run reports
status: "ok", not"complete", so a consumer that treats any status other thanokas a caveat no longer reports one;incompleteis unchanged. - A blocked or failed request no longer changes the exit code to 4. It is still recorded
in
request_failuresand makes the runstatus: incomplete.

